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Chapter 8: Does Participation Lead to Moderation? Understanding Changes in 
Egyptian Islamist Parties post-Arab Spring 
 
Barbara Zollner, Birkbeck, University of London  
 
Is it still important to consider the issue of participation and moderation in post-Spring 
Egypt? The question of inclusion and moderation was at the heart of debates about the 
prospect of the ‘taming’ of Islamist movements and parties throughout the early 2000s, that is 
at a time when democratisation seemed to be a possibility, albeit a distant one. In the post-
Spring era, which saw the return of an authoritarian regime under President ‘Abd al-Fatah al-
Sisi, there seems to be little taste for discussing whether there is still scope for the inclusion 
of Islamists in the political system.   
Yet, there is good reason to stipulate an ongoing relevance of this topic, particularly 
when studying Egypt’s Islamist parties in the post-Spring setting. Firstly, the change of 
context, that is from a semi-authoritarian multi-party-system under Mubarak to a 
democratising system during the Arab Spring and finally to a much more politically 
restrictive framework under al-Sisi, allows us to investigate the trajectories of Islamist parties 
and, in reference to pre-Spring analyses, to appraise their commitment to democratic values.
1
 
A second reason is related to the fact that there are a range of Islamist parties in post-Spring 
and post-coup Egyptian politics. Aside from the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim 
Brotherhood; MB) and its subsidiary Hizb al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala (Freedom and Justice 
Party; FJP), which were banned following the coup of 2013, there exists a wide spectrum of 
religious-based parties, which is, as Lynch rightly remarked, ‘unchartered’.2 When mapping 
these, one encounters a paradox. Salafi parties, which are ultra-conservative in their religious 
interpretations and are regarded as fundamentally incompatible with a democratic stance, 
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participated in the first post-coup parliamentary elections of 2015. Many of the so-called 
moderate Islamist parties, on the other hand, boycotted these elections, thus deliberately 
excluding themselves from the formal political contest. This brings us to a third reason for 
why it remains important to engage with the participation-moderation debate. Returning to 
previous assessments allows us to debate whether the conceptual framework continues to 
hold traction.
3
 Indeed, the post-Spring constellation of Islamist parties provides us with 
material to reflect on the issue of strategic versus ideological moderation and that of 
sequencing which, as Schwedler points out, constitute key aspects of the moderation debate.
4
   
The aim of this chapter is to critically examine the ‘participation-moderation’ thesis and, 
moreover, to engage in an original analysis of the political trajectories of Islamist parties in 
post-Spring Egypt. Focusing on those Islamist parties which demonstrated considerable 
influence in the period of democratic transition, in particular, the 2011/12 parliamentary 
elections as well as in the post-coup parliamentary elections of 2015, we can see that Salafi 
parties choose to participate for strategic reasons while reformist Islamist parties opted for 
non-participation. While the participation-moderation thesis remains a good starting point for 
analysing Islamist movements, the chapter reveals that the model has conceptual limitations 
with regards to the predicting ideological reform. 
 
Pluralisation of Islamist parties in post-spring Egypt  
Egypt saw a sharp increase in new political parties in the post-Spring era. About 80 new 
parties received their official licence in 2011, with slightly fewer new registrations of Islamist 
parties compared to those on the secular side.
5
 Overall, the spectrum of Islamist parties 
experienced a pluralisation, when more than 30 were registered in the course of 2011, of 
which about 20 took part in the contest for seats in the parliamentary elections of the same 
year. These included not only the Muslim Brotherhood-linked FJP, but also so-called 
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reformist Islamist parties that are, for the most part, Brotherhood offshoots such as Hizb Misr 
al-Qawmiyya (Strong Egypt Party; Strong Egypt), Hizb al-Tayyar al-Misri (Egyptian Current 
Party; ECP) and Hizb al-Wasat (al-Wasat). Furthermore, the post-Spring transition also saw 
the first-time formation of Salafi parties, amongst them the Alexandria/Delta based Hizb al-
Nour (Party of Light; al-Nour) and Hizb al-Bina’ wa al-Tanmiya (Building and Development 
Party; BDP), which represents the official outlet of the Jama'a al-Islamiyya (GI), as well as 
subsequent off-shoots of these parties, notably Hizb al-Asala (Authenticity Party; al-Asala) 
and Hizb al-Watan (Homeland Party; al-Watan). Beyond these, the table below illustrates that 
a large number of Islamist parties appeared on the formal political scene post-2011. Only a 
few of these gained seats, but the mere fact that a range of Islamist parties aimed for inclusion 
in the political process shows a shift in their strategic thinking and behaviour insofar as 
participation in formal processes became a viable option for them which allowed them to 
bring forward their political agenda.    
Table 1: Islamist Parties in the Post-Spring Era 
Party Name Legalised/ 
Banned 
Theology-based 
orientation 
Political 
spectrum
6
  
Hizb al-‘Adala al-Ijtima’iyya (Social Justice 
Party) 
1993 Socialist Left 
Hizb al-Amal al-Islami al-Masri (Egyptian 
Islamic Labour Party) 
2011 
Reformist with socialist 
tendencies 
Left 
Hizb al-Amal al-Jadid (New Labour Party) 2011 
Reformist with socialist 
tendencies 
Left 
Hizb al-Asala (Authenticity Party) 2011 Salafi Centre-Right 
Hizb al-Bina’ wa al-Tanmiya (Building and 
Development Party) 
2011 Salafi (GI) Right 
Hizb al-Fadila (Virtue Party) 2011 Salafi  Right 
Hizb al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala (Freedom and 2011; MB; orthodox tendencies Centre-Right 
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Justice Party) banned 2013  amongst leadership 
Hizb al-Islah al-Misri (Egyptian Reform 
Party) 
not 
Orthodox with reformist 
tendencies 
Ultra-Right 
Hizb al-Islah wa al-Nahda (Reform and 
Renaissance Party) 
2011 
Reformist tendencies; 
remains orthodox on 
key-issues 
Centre-Left 
Hizb al-Islah wa al-Ta’wiyya (Reform and 
Awakening Party) 
2011 Socialist Ultra-Left 
Hizb al-Islami (Islamic Party) not Salafi Ultra-Right 
Hizb al-Jihad al-Dimuqrati (Democratic Jihad 
Party) 
2012 Salafi Centre-right 
Hizb al-Misr al-Fatah (Young Egypt Party) 2011 Socialist Left 
Hizb al-Misr al-Mustaqbal (Egypt’s Future 
Party) 
2011 
Reformist with 
revolutionary tendencies 
Left 
HIzb al-Muhafdhin (Conservative Party) 2011 Orthodox Right 
Hizb al-Nahda (Renaissance Party) 
2011; merged 
with Hizb al-
Wasat in 2013 
Reformist with orthodox 
tendencies 
Right 
Hizb al-Nasr (Victory Party) 2011 Sufi  
Hizb al-Nour (al-Nour Party) 2011 
Salafi (al-Da‘wa al-
Salafiyya) 
Ultra-Right 
Hizb al-Raya (Flag Party) 2013 Salafi Ultra-Right 
Hizb al-Riyada (Pioneer Party) 2011 
Reformist tendencies; 
remains orthodox on key 
issues 
Centre-Left 
Hizb al-Sha’ab (People Party) not  Right 
Hizb al-Tahrir al-Misri 2011 Sufi (al-‘Azamiyya)  
Hizb al-Takaful (Solidarity Party) 2011  Right 
Hizb al-Tawhid al-Arabi (Arab Unification 2011 Socialist leanings with Left 
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Party) orthodox tendencies 
Hizb al-Umma (Umma Party) 1983 Socialist Left 
Hizb al-Wasat (al-Wasat Party) 2011 
Reformist with orthodox 
tendencies 
Centre-Left 
Hizb al-Watan (Homeland Party) 
2012 (off-
shoot from 
Hizb al-Nour) 
Salafi Right  
Hizb Misr al-Qawmiyya (Strong Egypt Party) 2012 Reformist Centre-left 
Hizb Misr al-Thawra 2011 Revolutionary Ultra-Left 
Hizb Nahdat Masr (Egypt Renaissance Party) 2011 
Reformist with orthodox 
tendencies 
Centre-right 
Hizb Shabab Misr (Youth for Egypt) 2005 
Reformist with strong 
orthodox tendencies 
Centre-right  
Hizb Sout al-Hurriyya (Voice of Egypt) 2011 Sufism  
Hizb al-Tayyar al-Misri (Egyptian Current 
Party; ECP) 
2011; merged 
with Hizb 
Misr al-
Qawmiyya in 
2014 
Reformist Centre-Left  
  
‘Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi’s ascendance to power in 2013 had a considerable impact on the 
Egyptian party landscape. Because of changes to electoral laws, the authoritarian shift under 
al-Sisi has reduced the influence of parties, both on the local as well as the national level.
7
 
Beyond this, Islamist parties underwent considerable contraction in terms of their presence in 
the political system. Most obviously, the FJP and its mother-organisation the MB were 
banned in the course of the autumn of 2013. This left a vacuum in Islamist presence, which 
was only partially filled by Salafi and other reformist parties. In fact, only al-Nour managed 
to secure seats in the 2015 parliamentary elections, although its presence decreased in 
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comparison to its previous result.  Also, a number of Islamist parties folded, partly because of 
the pressures of regime change and partly because they could mobilise only little support. 
The table above indicates the disappearance of these parties, with notable changes to the 
reformist field. Not unexpectedly, smaller Islamist parties were pushed to consolidate, 
merging with parties that held similar political views and often competed for the same 
constituency. Amongst them were the ECP which joined Strong Egypt as well as al-Nahda 
Party which joined al-Wasat. Following this consolidation two reformist parties remain 
meaningful players in the field of Islamist actors: Strong Egypt and al-Wasat. On the other 
end of the spectrum, meanwhile, we can detect some changes due to intra-organisational 
tensions which led to offshoots forming. The case of al-Nour is of note here, whereby Emad 
‘Abd al-Ghaffour, one of the founders of the party, moved on to establish al-Watan in late 
2012.
8
 Yet, the increase of numbers due to spits and offshoots is rather marginal, while it is 
likely that small and medium sized parties will either disappear or, once again, merge with 
larger parties. Overall, the post-Spring era presents us with a varied spectrum which will, 
despite al-Sisi’s seemingly anti-Islamist policies continue to influence Egyptian politics in the 
years to come.  
 
Ideological moderation of Islamist parties?  
The participation of Islamist parties in post-2011 politics demonstrates that it is necessary to 
distinguish between strategic and ideological moderation.9 When applying this 
differentiation, we can observe three trajectories. Firstly, the case of the FJP shows that 
participation can have a negative effect on intra-organisational reform. Secondly, the political 
decisions and subsequent actions of reformist Islamist parties, such as for instance al-Wasat 
and Strong Egypt, evidence that moderation, particularly ideological and value-based 
moderation, can lead to non-participation. Finally, whilst remaining dedicated to the electoral 
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process, the trajectory of Salafi parties, amongst them al-Nour and the BDP, demonstrates 
that there is evidence of strategic moderation, but little indication for substantial, micro-level 
ideological reform.  
The post-Spring development of the FJP is an example of strategic moderation, 
which, paradoxically, came at the expense of ideological moderation. Being largely 
dependent on the directives of the MB leadership, the case of the FJP shows that the 
opportunities afforded by formal political participation in the post-Mubarak era undercut a 
rising reformist tendency within the organisation and thus played power into the hands of an 
‘old guard’ that had continued to dominate the group’s Guidance Council.10  
What makes the case of the MB confusing is the fact that socio-religiously orthodox 
and politically conservative members who, for decades, dominated the MB’s leading 
Guidance Council (Maktab al-Irshad), did not show much interest in political participation 
throughout the Mubarak period, rather focussing on changing Egyptian society in the way of 
acceding to conservative socio-religious norms. The MB’s politics of opposition to the 
regime at the time was driven by a reformist faction that had gradually built up its strength 
since the late 1980s.
11
 As such, they developed a presence in professional syndicates and, 
beyond that, attempted to gain seats in parliament either through alliances with other parties, 
as in the elections of 1984 and 1987, or by running independent candidates, such as in the 
elections 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010.
12
  
The formation of al-Wasat in 1996 exposed open rifts between reformists and the 
MB’s conservative leadership. The trigger was an attempt by reformists to formulate a party 
platform in 1996 with the aim of obtaining legal recognition by state authorities. Not only did 
the MB leadership see the initiative as a challenge to its authority, but it also rejected ideas in 
the platform document which suggested equal political rights for women and for minorities.  
These ideational differences led to an intra-organisational crisis that resulted in the departure 
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of several members, most notably Abu al-‘Ala al-Madi. He continued to run al-Wasat as an 
alternative to the MB, albeit gaining legal recognition only in 2011.  
In August 2007, reformists and the Guidance Council, this time under the leadership 
of Mahdi ‘Akif, once again clashed in another party-platform debate. At the centre of this 
crisis was again the formulation of the goals of a future political party, but also the issue of 
the political rights of non-Muslims and the equal status of women.
13
 The tension between 
reformists and conservatives culminated in the controversy over the succession of ‘Akif. 
With the election of Muhammad Badi‘a, the Guidance Council made a clear stance against 
Muhammad Habib, the Deputy Murshid, who was sympathetic to reformists. These events 
show that, although attempts at reform gained so much ground that they reached the echelons 
of the MB’s executive, reformists failed to substantially change the organisation. It is for this 
reason that a number of experts who reviewed the level of the MB’s ideological moderation, 
amongst them Wickham and Trager, critically remarked that, despite much intra-
organisational debate, political-religious key-frames were not sufficiently re-addressed.
14
  
The final round of this intra-organisational battle played out in the post-Spring period. 
It is then that the religiously, socially and politically conservative leadership prepared to 
participate in formal political processes. The Guidance Council regarded the creation of a 
political party as a strategic opportunity to influence the transition process. Members of the 
reformist faction such as ‘Abd al-Mun’im Abu al-Futuh, Islam Lutfi and Muhammad Habib  
meanwhile rejected the step, taking the position that any decisions over the creation of a 
party, or indeed regarding the status of the MB as a social movement or political foundation, 
needed to be debated collectively in the Shura Council as the MB’s central democratic 
organ.
15
 The Guidance Council fended off this challenge by pressing forward with the 
establishment of the FJP which thus became a political mouthpiece of the conservative MB 
leadership. Moreover, by placing an emphasis on organisational cohesion, leading members 
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of the reformist tendency were forced to leave after a short and intense battle over the 
organisation’s direction, while others, amongst them Issam al-Arayan and Sa’ad Katatny, 
chose to conform (and then being rewarded with leadership roles in the MB and FJP).
16
  
Islam Lutfi, Muhammad al-Qassas, Ahmad ‘Abd al-Gawad, Hani Mahmud, 
Muhammad Affan, Ibrahim Za’afrani and Muhammad Habib left the MB. A similar fate 
befell Abu al-Futuh who pointed out that his expulsion in April 2011, following his 
announcement that he intended to run as a candidate in the presidential elections of 2012, was 
not due to having broken with MB directives at the time but was rather due to his persistent 
differences with the group’s leadership.17 This deep rift also affected the MB, and by 
extension, the FJP along generational lines, not least because many young MB activists were 
ideationally closer to reformist circles. When the conservative leadership attempted to 
conscribe them into the FJP, it triggered a dispute about the right of MB members to support 
political parties other than the FJP or, as a young female MB activist emphasised, the right to 
not support any party.
18
 The Guidance Council enforced its authority, which led to the 
departure of a number of MB youth and student leaders. By the end of 2011, there was little 
intra-organisational contestation to the Guidance Council which continued to imprint its 
ideological understandings upon the FJP. 
The strategic choice to participate in democratic processes gave the MB access to 
pursue a vision of an Islamic state through formal institutions. According to the official MB 
position, its idea of the state was both civic and Islamic.
19
 This relates to the position that 
legal interpretation and legislative powers of a parliament are allowed in areas where the 
Qur’an is not explicit or in areas which are not considered part of the Sunni legal consent. In 
these terms, the MB ideology shows a degree of temperance, one which allows a state to be 
defined as Islamic, while being at the same time civic. Still, the MB and its subsidiary, the 
FJP, have retained an ideological vision that remains religiously orthodox and vested in 
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socially conservative concepts. This is particularly obvious on contested issues such as the 
equal status of women and equal citizenship rights for non-Muslim minorities.
20
 The FJP’s 
political success during 2011-13 was seen by the MB leadership as a public validation for its 
strategic choices. Being the dominant political force, there was no incentive for ideological 
moderation. Yet, this set party and mother-organisation on a course of confrontation with the 
military on the one hand and with other political parties and movements on the other hand.  
If the participation-moderation model suggests a sequential development whereby 
political inclusion leads to strategic and eventually to ideological reform, the trajectory of 
reformist parties disproves it. As seen above in the case of the reformist faction within the 
MB, ideological moderation took place before the establishment of its parties. The fact that 
the founding leaders of today’s reformist Islamist parties abandoned the MB umbrella is not 
purely incidential, but indicates that ideological moderation is the result of intra-
organisational disputes rather than the outcome of political participation. This holds true for 
al-Wasat, for instance, whose founding members, notably al-Madi, were forced to leave the 
MB in 1996.
21
 This is also the case for the ECP which was set up by former MB Youth 
Leaders, al-Qassas and ‘Abd al-Gawad in June 2011, or for al-Nahda, which was set up by al-
Za’frani and which was joined shortly after by Habib.22 Strong Egypt was established by Abu 
al-Futuh two years after his expulsion and a year after his unsuccessful candidacy in the 2012 
presidential elections.
23
 Despite losing against the MB’s candidate, Muhammad Mursi, Abu 
al-Futuh was able to present himself as a significant alternative. Moreover, the fact that 
reformist parties were set up at a time when the MB/FJP dominated the Islamist spectrum 
indicates that the concept of sequencing is flawed. Competing against the MB/ FJP, these 
new parties had relatively little prospect of immediate success; hence the choice to set up 
reformist parties was first and foremost driven by ideological contretemps rather than 
strategic prospects. This point comes through in an interview with al-Qassas of the ECP in 
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November 2011, when he admitted his party was relatively underrepresented in rural areas 
and hence did not field candidates in all districts.
24
 Beyond this, as will be set out below, the 
most important indication that sequencing is not a reliable facet of the participation-
moderation model is the fact that most reformist parties decided to boycott the 2015 
parliamentary elections. It demonstrates that ideological moderation can lead to the refusal to 
participate and consequently the rejection of potential political representation for a legislative 
period.  
Because of their background, the aforementioned reformist parties retained a softened 
version of the ‘ikhwani’ political frames and even take inspiration from the MB’s 
foundational history. This said, they also distance themselves from the MB to an extent which 
cannot be explained merely as a strategic choice but which involves a more fundamental 
ideational shift towards moderation. Indeed, overall reformist parties show a propensity 
towards democratic values which sets them apart from the orthodoxy of the MB. Where they 
differ, however, is the profundity and diffusion of democratic values in their programms and, 
beyond this, their social and political leanings.  
Al-Wasat, previously also al-Nahda, are perhaps slightly more traditionalist on social 
issues and politically more centrist-right.
25
 In its religious interpretation, the Wasat faction is 
inspired by a religiously-reformist current which Baker described as ‘New Islamists’.26 
Furthermore, Wickham notes, reformists aquired political skills by interacting with other 
contenders that were in opposition to Mubarak’s regime.27 Although al-Wasat underwent 
fundamental ideological change, there are nevertheless areas where its tendentiously more 
orthodox views remains tangible. These are, first and foremost, al-Wasat’s view that shari’a 
is the principle source of legislation, but also the orthodox position held by the party that 
parts of Islamic law are divinely defined (however, it is not clear which areas are fixed). The 
final controversial point touches on gender equality. Although al-Wasat emphasises women’s 
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equality, the party retains conservative views on the role of women in family and society. 
Considering these issues, Wickham therefore argues voices concerns about al-Wasat’s level 
of ideological moderation.  
Strong Egypt, and previously also ECP, meanwhile, have made a much clearer step 
towards fully accepting liberal democratic values. Although El Sherif is critical of the party’s 
ideological sophistication, it needs to be recognised that Stong Egypt no longer regards an 
Islamic state or the implementation of shari‘a as goals.28 Hence, in the stricter sense, it is no 
longer an Islamist party, but a ‘Muslim democratic party’ with center-left leanings. To 
illustate this, Abu al-Futuh stressed that he stands for the protection of individual rights, 
recognises full gender equality and freedom of religion as core values.
29
 Drawing a 
comparison to parties that draw on Christian values, such as the Christian Democratic Parties, 
he argues that there is no reason why religious values should not be at the heart of political 
convictions. Similar points were made by al-Qassas who, after the merger of the ECP with 
Strong Egypt, has acted as its Head of Political Communication. He added that there needs to 
be separation of religion and state, yet on a personal level religion does matter in politics.
30
 
As mentioned above, Strong Egypt and al-Wasat boycotted the post-coup 
parliamentary elections of 2015. However, their reactions to the coup show fundamental 
differences in their political positions. Al-Wasat condemned the events of July 2013 and 
subsequently joined the Anti-Coup Coalition. Despite its conflicts with the MB, it regarded 
Mursi’s presidency carrying democratic legitimacy and argued that the 2013 Constitution 
reflected the ideas of a civic state based on Islamic principles.
31
 Strong Egypt, on the other 
hand, had previously expressed support for the mass-movement against Mursi’s government 
and, although it objected to the military’s intervention, it did not give its support to the Anti-
Coup Alliance.
32
 This shows that they differed on the question of Mursi’s legitimacy and the 
path to transforming Egypt. Still, both agreed that the military coup was a backward step 
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which opened the door to the renewed authoritarianism under al-Sisi. This led them to call for 
a boycott of the 2014 Presidential Elections and, subsequently of the 2015 parliamentary 
elections. Despite leaving the Anti-Coup Alliance in August 2014, al-Wasat’s rejection of the 
regime was expressed in much clearer terms in the run-up to the parliamentary elections, 
openly criticising arbitrary arrests, amongst them the party leader al-Madi, human rights 
violations, and, more broadly, questioning the legitimacy of al-Sisi’s rule.33 Strong Egypt’s 
critique was more cautious, voicing particular concerns about constitutional issues, electoral 
laws and the return of patrimonial politics without attacking the regime directly.
34
 In all, both 
reformist parties take a clear stance against the return of authoritarian politics, a position, 
which is informed by an appreciation of democratic values. This shows that ideological 
moderation can lead to the rejection of opportunities provided by formal participation. 
Salafi parties, meanwhile, reconfirm that a clear distinction is needed between 
strategic moderation and ideological moderation.
35
  Their participation in pre- and post-coup 
parliamentary elections is rooted in a strategic calculus that allows them to voice their ultra-
conservative socio-religious views and agenda in a public manner. Yet, as Drevon 
convincingly shows, neither al-Nour nor the BDP have revised their ideological premises in a 
substantial manner.
36
  
There are a number of Salafi Parties, but al-Nour has been the most successful in 
recent years. Its main influence is in Alexandria and the Delta region, where the loose 
network of al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya (Salafi Call) has had some impact.37  Saudi-Wahhabi 
principles inform its ideological outlook, as can be seen in the writings of al-Nour leader 
Yasser Hussein Burhami.
38
 Yet, intra-organisational tensions over the direction of the party, 
particularly on what a Salafi party should stand for, emerged in the course of 2012. This led 
to the departure of ‘Abd al-Ghaffour in December of the same year; he went on to establish 
the electorally less successful al-Watan Party.
39
 As for al-Nour, it backed protests against 
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Mursi in 2013; yet the party was reluctant to support al-Sisi after the events of July 2013.
40
 
Leaving all strategic options open, al-Nour did not support the return of al-Mursi to power, 
nor did it support the military intervention. Al-Nour deliberately hung back from calling for 
challenges to the transitional government or subsequently to al-Sisi’s regime. The party thus 
evaded major arrests and, despite a legal challenge to its status, was able to survive.
41
 In the 
2014 Constitutional Referendum, al-Nour urged voters to support the new legal framework, 
thus indicating a pragmatic and tactical approach to politics. Its strategic calculation became 
apparent when al-Nour fielded candidates for the parliamentary elections of 2015.
42
  Gaining 
11 seats, all of which through independent candidacies in the Delta and Cairo, it became the 
only Islamist Party with seats in the House of Representatives. Yet, compared to its previous 
results in 2011/12, the results were rather poor and thus did not fill the void left by the FJP. 
The Salafi stance also finds representation in the BDP and the Authenticity Party. 
While al-Nour has its roots in the Salafi-Wahhabi trend of the Delta region, the BDP is 
directly linked to the GI which was particularly dominant in Upper Egypt and in poorer areas 
of Cairo with a dominant Sa‘idi population. As a party, the BDP was established in 2011 
upon the initiative of the GI leadership.
43
 Similar to the BDP is al-Asala; although the party is 
not directly linked to the GI, it drew members from it’s circles. Both parties show similarities 
with al-Nour in their post-Spring political trajectory. The BDP showed some modest success 
in this electoral contest where it won 10 seats, while al-Asala secured 3 seats.
44
 The BDP and 
al-Asala joined the Anti-Coup Alliance, but, because of tactical manoeuvres similar to those 
of al-Nour, avoided major repercussions. Still, the post-coup era left the BDP and al-Asala 
side-lined. Although both parties withdrew from the Anti-Coup Alliance in 2015, they failed 
to secure any seats in the 2015 elections. 
As an organisation, the GI was known for its militancy. It was involved a number of 
terrorist activities, including  the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat and the 1997 Luxor attack 
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which claimed 87 lives.
45
 Subsequently, the organisation underwent a ‘de-radicalisation’ 
process.
46
 Analysing fundamental ideological positions, Meijer shows that the GI applied a 
dual strategy; on the one hand it justified the use of militancy, but also undertook to build 
wider social support amongst ultra-conservative sections of society.
47
 It is the latter aspect 
which remained the strategic focus of the GI in its four central books published in 2004 
which articulate their renunciation of violence to their supporters. Yet, Drevon critically 
remarks that despite the recantation of violence, militancy as a political tactic was never 
formally rejected.
48
 In fact, jihad, even in its violent interpretation, continued to be regarded 
as a strategic option should the context in question call for such actions. Although its party, 
the BDP, formally engages in political participation, the GI retains this position until today. 
Hence, there remains a distinct question-mark over their ideological moderation and they thus 
remains a clear example of moderation on the strategic level only.
49
  
The political ambivalence of Salafi parties evidences the strategic calculus that binds 
these to political participation. These organisations are far from re-evaluating their 
ideological positions. Although there is an ongoing intra-organisational debate in all three 
Salafi cases, this does not amount to ideological moderation. Given that al-Sisi’s regime 
appears to tolerate their political participation and, in fact, appears to regard Salafis as an 
Islamist alternative to the MB that can be held in check because their ultra-orthodox ideas do 
not find wide support, there is little incentive for change as there is little internal or external 
pressure which could trigger intra-organisational debates which are key to ideological reform.  
 
Conclusion 
Does the political participation of Islamist parties lead to moderation? The cases of Egyptian 
Islamist parties in the post-Spring era seems to challenge the participation-moderation model. 
The model suggests that, by including parties in formal political processes, these change not 
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only their political behaviours, but eventually also their ideological frames. Looking at post-
Spring Egyptian cases, we can trace a variety of political trajectories amongst Islamist 
parties, but none of these actually substantiate the participation-moderation model. As we 
have seen above, the FJP’s development demonstrates that participation in formal politics can 
undermine ideological reform. The various Salafi movements participate in elections, but 
there is little evidence of ideological reform. Finally, reformist movements accepted 
democratic values, but this had the effect that they boycotted the 2015 Parliamentary 
Elections; in short, their ideological moderation led to non-participation. 
Still, the paradigm, if used critically and with caution, remains a useful facsimile, 
perhaps an ideal-type, by which to assess the trajectories of political parties in transition. 
Egyptian post-Spring developments show us that numerous Islamist parties adapted to the 
new political setting and as such showed some level of moderation. As such, strategic 
moderation is a minimal denominator as it allows Islamist parties, similar to any other legally 
recognised party, access to pursuing their agenda through formal political institutions. From 
this point of view, participation has a direct, positive effect, although many of the more 
influential parties such as the FJP, al-Nour, BDP and al-Ansar merely participated due to 
strategic calculations and without engaging in substantial ideological re-framing.  
While participation has a direct impact on strategic moderation, the Egyptian cases of 
Islamist parties suggests that ideological moderation is not prompted by political inclusion. 
When reviewing Islamist parties in the post-coup era, there is no case which could evidence a 
direct relationship between participation and ideological moderation. The participation of the 
MB during 2011-2013 undermined the possibility of ideological moderation; the reason for 
this lies in the fact that there were little incentives for the organisation to change. While there 
is little concrete evidence that the MB and its, now irrelevant, FJP has any intention to turn to 
violence as a strategic option in response to its ban in 2013, this aspect in itself does not 
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demonstrate ideological moderation in terms of a relative process of accepting democratic 
principles and values. Salafi parties such as al-Nour, BDP, al-Ansar and al-Watan continue to 
participate in post-coup political processes, but they also show little sign of ideological 
reform. Their turn to formal politics is mainly driven by a strategic calculus, thereby 
continuing to consider violent jihad as a potential option should a formal institutional path be 
blocked. Moreover, their views on the status of non-Muslims and the role of women in 
society and politics remain firmly guided by ultra-orthodox religious precepts. Only reformist 
parties show a considerable degree of ideological moderation, although with notable 
differences between them. As such, al-Wasat remains more on the orthodox side of the 
reformist spectrum given its positions on shari’a. Not altogether successfully, al-Wasat 
attempts to bridge the gap between traditional Islamic positions and democratic values. 
Strong Egypt, however, clearly demonstrates a high level of ideological moderation, 
supporting positions which present an interpretation of Islam that is fully compatible with 
democratic processes and liberal values. Yet, even in the case of Strong Egypt, this 
ideological moderation is not necessarily the result of political participation, but rather the 
outcome of reflections triggered by a dispute with the conservative MB leadership.  The fact 
that reformist parties boycotted the 2015 elections in protest against the return to an 
authoritarian state system epitomises that ideological moderation is not the result of 
participation; on the contrary, non-participation here is the consequence of ideological 
moderation. 
Reformist parties which did engage in ideological moderation, thus undergoing a 
micro-level transformation that internalised (at least to a considerable extent) democratic 
principles and values, did not re-frame their positions as a result of participation in the 
political system. In fact, in all cases of reformist Islamist parties it is apparent that their 
ideological shifts are the outcome of intra-organisational debates; in the Egyptian cases, these 
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resulted in the departure of reformists from their mother-organisations as ideological 
differences proved irreconcilable. We can identify several triggers for intra-organisational 
tensions, both negative and positive factors which put the given parties under considerable 
pressure. These include 1) levels of repression and exclusion which, as in the Tunisian case, 
encourage parties to foster alliances and thus to negotiate with what constituted previous 
opponents; 2) (relative) political openings which, as in the Egyptian cases, provide new 
opportunities to participate and to absorb political skills; and/or 3) tensions caused by 
generational cleavages. In any case, the process of ideological moderation is not triggered by 
a strategic consideration as there is usually a high cost involved, adversely affecting a party’s 
mobilising capacity and hence its short-term strategic influence. Taken beyond the remit of 
Egypt’s Islamist parties, there is thus certainly reason to substantially reconsider elements of 
the participation-moderation model, albeit without dismissing the basic concept completely.  
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